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Abstract
Using county-level data on federal New Deal expenditures on public works and relief and Agricultural Adjustment
Administration payments to farmers, this paper empirically examines the New Deals impact on inter-county
migration from 1930 to 1940. We construct a net-migration measure for each county as the difference between the
Censuss reported population change from 1930 to 1940 and the natural increase in population (births minus infant
deaths minus non-infant deaths) over the same period. Our empirical approach accounts for both the simultaneity
between New Deal allocations and migration and the geographic spillovers that likely resulted when economic
activity in one county may have affected the migration decisions of people in neighboring counties. We find that
greater spending on relief and public works was associated with significant migration into counties where such
money was allocated. The introduction of our modern farm programs under the aegis of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration appears to have contributed to a net out-migration that sped the transition of people out of farming.
1.

Introduction

Migration has long been a central issue in understanding economic development. 1 A citizen’s ability to move also
has important political-economy ramifications. State and local governments must set fiscal and social policies
subject to the constraint that citizens can exit and/or enter. Many modern studies that attempt to determine how
various public policies affect migration incentives often focus on moves across state lines either because of data
limitations or the federal government’s increasingly strong role in social policy over the course of the 20th century
has served to reduce the variation in benefits across local jurisdictions. Yet more people migrate across counties
within states than migrate across state lines (US Bureau of the Census, 1975, p. 76). Thus many ‘‘welfare magnet’’
migration studies miss a significant portion of the migration activity across political boundaries. 2 These intrastate
political boundaries were particularly important in earlier historical periods when social welfare policies were set
more by local jurisdictions than they are today and especially during the 1930s, when the federal government
distributed dramatically different amounts of money per capita across states and across counties within states.
To better understand how social programs might affect migration decisions, this paper explores a unique
episode in American history. During the Great Depression there were substantial variations in the economic
downturn across the country, which led to examples like the fictional Joad family’s escape from the Oklahoma Dust
Bowl so vividly portrayed by John Steinbeck in The Grapes of Wrath. What made the 1930s unique was the federal
government’s unprecedented large-scale provision of direct relief, work relief, public works projects, and farm
subsidy programs. The amounts spent staggered the imagination at the time. More importantly for the purposes of
our investigation, the amounts spent varied substantially across states and often even were more variable from
county to county within states. Further, the relief and public works programs are predicted to have different effects
on net migration than the farm programs. Unlike many studies that focus on only one type of program, we examine
both types of program simultaneously. The migrations in response to these differences in federal spending on the
various programs had the potential to lead to a substantial realignment of the American population. Internal
migration during the 1930s was generally smaller than in the surrounding decades, as has been the case in most
modern recessions. Even so, there were still substantial flows of migrants. In 1940 approximately 11% of the
1

For recent treatments of this issue, see Hatton and Williamson (1998), Borjas (1999), and Ferrie (1999).
For estimates of the impact of modern welfare benefit levels on migration decisions across states, see Gramlich and Laren (1984), Blank (1998),
Moffitt (1992), Allard and Danziger (2000), and Levine and Zimmerman (1999). Kauffman and Kiesling (1997) did study welfare benefits within
the states but only focused on Brooklyn and Manhattan.
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population had migrated since 1935 and 60% of them had moved within the same state (US Bureau of the Census,
1943, p. 5).
After entering office in 1933, the Roosevelt administration introduced a number of emergency spending
programs, while also establishing many of the federal social policies that exist today, such as unemployment
insurance, social security, and the minimum wage. During the course of the 1930s the amounts that all governments
paid out for public aid in the form of work relief, public works spending, direct relief, and the social security aid
programs rose 10- to 20-fold. The US moved away from a purely state and local system of public aid prior to 1933
to a situation where the federal government spent nearly five times as much on public aid as the states did during the
middle 1930s. By the end of the 1930s the federal government was still spending nearly 2.5 times as much as state
and local governments on public assistance. Much of the federal public assistance came in the form of work relief
that contributed to the building of civil infrastructure. Large numbers of the unemployed also found work on federal
public works projects that built federal roads, dams, buildings, and other projects in unprecedented numbers. The
Agricultural Adjustment Administration first introduced payments to farmers to take land out of production, which
led to fundamental changes in the demand for farm labor and potentially a redistribution of income from farm
workers to landowners. Had the various New Deal programs been evenly distributed across the country, these
programs probably would have had only a limited effect on net migration. On a per capita basis, however, New Deal
spending during the 1930s was highly variable from county to county. With such variation the New Deal programs
might well have influenced people’s decisions to move during the heart of the Great Depression. 3
Using census data on the change in population between 1930 and 1940 and county-level counts of births
and deaths throughout the 1930s, we have developed new estimates of net migration for over 3000 counties during
the 1930s using the US Bureau of the Census components-of-change method. 4 The data allow consideration of the
significant amount of intrastate migration that is overlooked in many migration studies. After comparing and
contrasting our estimates of net migration with earlier estimates by Gardner and Cohen (1992), we combine the netmigration data with our New Deal information to examine how migration patterns during the 1930s were influenced
by the federal government’s intervention in the depressed economy. We use ordinary least squares estimates to
establish the baseline relationship between net migration and New Deal grants, economic activity, and a variety of
social, demographic, and geographic factors. We then move to a two stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental
variables approach to control for the potential endogeneity of New Deal spending. Finally, we examine the impact of
spatial correlations in the errors and geographic spillover effects of economic activity using a generalized two stage
least squares technique developed by Kelejian and Prucha (2004). Controlling for the spatial correlation in a
migration study is important because people moving into one county necessarily came from another county, creating
a spatial dependence across counties.
The results suggest that New Deal spending had quite varied effects on net migration. Federal spending on
public works and relief programs contributed to significant net in-migration, accounting for between 5 and 16% of
the difference in average net-migration rates between counties with net in-migration and counties with net outmigration. Meanwhile, the introduction of our modern farm programs under the aegis of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration appears to have contributed to a net out-migration that sped the transition of people out of farming.
Differences in average AAA spending explain between 3 and 5% of the difference in net out-migration rates
between the two types of counties. Finally, differences in economic activity across counties, measured by retail sales
per capita, explain 10% and possibly more of the differences in net-migration rates for the two types of counties.
2. New estimates of net migration between 1930 and 1940
We have developed new estimates of net migration for each county during the 1930s. Annual data on births, deaths,
infant deaths, and stillbirths in each county during the 1930s were collected from the US Censuss vital statistics
reports. These demographic data allow us to calculate net migration into or out of each county from 1930 to 1940 as
a residual measure, also known as the components-of-change method. The measure is defined as the difference
between the Censuss reported population change from 1930 to 1940 and the natural increase in population (births
minus infant deaths minus non-infant deaths) over the same period, 1930–1940. Therefore,

3
Bogue et al. (1957) analyzed 1930s migration trends using census information reporting the location of individuals in 1935 and 1940. They
found shifts from rural to urban areas; from central cities to suburbs; shifts westward, particularly from the Midwest; a shift of the black
population from the South into the North; and substantial movement by white collar and educated workers. Their empirical analysis, however,
said very little about the New Deal and how the various programs might have influenced migration.
4
See the notes to series c25–c27 in the US Bureau of the Census (1975, p. 87) for a discussion of the components of change method and estimates
at the state level using the method for the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.
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We then adjusted the measure to account for the undercounting of births in each state (see Data appendix A). A netmigration rate per 1000 is then calculated using the 1930 population. Throughout the paper we focus the discussion
on internal migration within the United States, but county-level net-migration estimates can also be affected by
international migration. Because annual immigration into the United States slowed to among the lowest levels in
American history by the combination of the Depression and restrictions on immigration, international movements
were probably only a small part of the net migration equation in an individual county.
Our estimates of county-level net-migration offer an alternative to those that Gardner and Cohen
(henceforth, GC) developed. GC also used a residual technique based on the difference in population between 1930
and 1940 and an estimate of the natural rate of increase. Their estimates of the natural rate of increase, however,
were developed by applying national survival rates from 1930 to 1940 for each age/sex/ race group in the US to the
age/sex/race structure in each county in 1930. Since the survival method provides little guidance for the 0–9 age
group, their estimate of net migration is for people over the age of nine as of 1940, which implies that birth rates are
irrelevant to their migration calculations. 5
GC’s method of estimating the natural rate of increase is subject to measurement error because it applies
national survival rates to a diverse set of counties. Our measure also could suffer from measurement error to the
extent that births and deaths were inaccurately reported. Such measurement error may not have been fully eliminated
even after adjusting for state-level birth undercounts. We believe that our measure of net migration is better suited
for analyzing the impact of the New Deal because once we include controls for the age, sex, and racial composition
of the county population in 1930, we have controlled nearly all of the cross-sectional variation that GC use to
develop their residual net-migration estimates. Thus, nearly all of the cross-sectional variation that is left is driven
purely by the difference in population between 1930 and 1940. In essence, the controls for age, sex, and race would
turn a regression analysis using the GC measure into an examination of population growth.
We have performed extensive comparisons of the two measures, which are reported in an Appendix
available from the authors. Despite the differences in the techniques, it is reassuring that our estimate and the GC
estimate are closely related, displaying a correlation across counties of 0.98. There is no direct measure of net
migration for the entire decade at any level, but the 1940 Census contained a question about migration between 1935
and 1940 that can be used to determine net migration for that period for some geographic levels. The Census did not
report information at the county level, but we can make comparisons at the state level. The correlation between our
1930 and 1940 estimates aggregated to the state level and the state-level Census 1935–1940 measure is 0.94. The
GC estimates, aggregated to the state level, have a correlation of 0.92 with the 1940 Census measure. 6 Table 1
shows a comparison of the net-migration rates using all three methodologies at the state level. The three measures
similarly suggest that the states with the highest rates of net in-migration include Florida, California, Nevada,
Oregon, Delaware, Maryland, New Mexico, Washington, and Idaho. The largest out-migration rates were found in
the Great Plains states of North Dakota, South Dakota, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska, and the southern states of
Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia. There was also substantial variation within states, as the standard
deviation of our net-migration rate within 26 states was larger than the standard deviation across the country for the
state averages. As a check on the robustness of our empirical analysis of the determinants of migration, we estimated
the models below using both our measure and the GC measure. Since the results are very similar under both sets of
estimates, we focus the discussion in the paper on our estimated migration rates. 7
5

Gardner and Cohen also developed rough estimates of net migration for the age group under 10, but expressed reservations about their
accuracy. The correlation between their measure of net migration using all age groups and using just those 10 and over is 0.995, so we make
comparisons of our estimates with their estimates for ages 10 and over.
6
Comparisons of the three methods of calculations for net migration led to the following conclusions. First, for scholars interested in annual net
migration there is a time aggregation bias problem for all three because all three methods miss people who both migrate in and migrate out of the
county between the beginning and ending dates (and vice versa). This aggregation problem can only be solved with data for shorter time periods.
Second, our method takes into account migration by people born after the starting date of the period, while the 1935–1940 Census and Gardner
and Cohen methods do not (although Gardner and Cohen developed some estimate of births during the period that they do not have much
confidence in). Third, our method includes people as net in-migrants who migrate into a county and then die before 1940 and out-migrants who
move to another county and die before 1940. Neither the Census 1935–1940 information nor the Gardner and Cohen survival method includes
these migrants. Thus, there may be a bias if people are interested in the number of net-migrants in a county who are still alive in 1940. Since
migrants tend to be younger with lower death rates, we believe this will not be a serious bias. To the extent that the deaths of immigrants in a
county are greater (less) than the deaths of outmigrants from the county, we will overstate (understate) the number of immigrants who were still
there in 1940.
7
We are in the middle of analyzing the 1935–1940 household migration data from the IPUMS, where we can use data on New Deal spending for
over 450 state economic areas (SEA), as counties are not reported. We ran a preliminary logit regression on 250,000 household heads decisions to
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3. New deal grants
The myriad of economic problems arising from the Great Depression led the Roosevelt administration to develop a
variety of New Deal programs, ranging from the building of infrastructure to the regulation of employment,
industry, and the financial sector. Our specific focus is on the New Deal programs that distributed federal money in
the form of non-repayable grants. In 1940 the US Office of Government Reports (OGR) compiled a detailed
statistical description of the federal government’s grant expenditures in over 3000 counties for the period March 3,
1933, through July 30, 1939. 8
The federal government distributed $16.5 billion in non-repayable grants over the 6-year period. The grants
represented an unprecedented role for the federal government during peacetime. The New Deal increased the federal
government’s outlays as

switch SEAs as a function of economic activity and the New Deal variables in the household heads location as of 1940, some individual
characteristics like age and education, and state dummies. The results are similar to our county-level results in this paper. People are more likely
to have moved from an SEA in 1935 to the current SEA in 1940 when the 1940 location had higher spending on public works and relief
throughout the 1930s and the effect is statistically significant. The AAA effect is negative although not statistically significant.
8
The Office of Government Reports also provided information on $10.4 billion in repayable loans and $2.7 billion in mortgage loans insured by
the Federal Housing Administration. We do not focus on these programs in this paper for several reasons. First, unlike the grants, the subsidies
for the loans and mortgages are based on the difference between the interest charged and alternative interest rates and the favorability of
repayment terms, for which we have no information. Second, we faced difficulties in finding enough effective instruments to simultaneously
identify more than two or three New Deal variables in a system of equations. In attempts to use our group of instruments to simultaneously
identify equations where the FHA and loans are included along with the grants as endogenous variables, the 2SLS results contain no statistically
significant effects for any variables, which is a sign that the instruments are too weak to identify the system. Third, by omitting the loans and
FHA insurance we reduce measurement error and the omitted variable bias in our estimates of New Deal grants is likely to be small. The
correlations of the public works and relief grants with farm loans, non-farm loans, and FHA insured loans are 0.06, 0.03, and 0.15, respectively.
The AAA grant spending is largely uncorrelated with non-farm loans and FHA insured loans at -0.07 and 0.14, respectively. However, the AAA
grant spending may be picking up some of the impact of farm loans, because the correlation is high at 0.75 and Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis find
that the determinants of the geographic distribution of farm loans and AAA grants had similar effects.
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a share of GDP from about 4 to 8%. Furthermore, the federal government began spending large amounts of money
where it had spent very little before, setting the stage for a long-term structural shift in the financial responsibilities
of the national, state, and local governments. 9 As a share of government expenditures at all levels, the New Deal
raised the proportion of federal spending from 30% in 1932 to 46% by 1940 (Wallis, 1984, pp. 141–142).
We can divide the non-repayable New Deal grants into two major categories that potentially had quite
different impacts on the economy—public works and relief grants; and Agricultural Adjustment Administration
(AAA) benefits paid to farmers. We group public works and relief grants together because the programs had broadly
similar goals of providing employment for a large number of workers and building a wide variety of public works
and providing other public services. Relief grants were primarily distributed under the auspices of the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) from 1933 through mid 1935, the Civil Works Administration (CWA)
from November 1933 through March 1934, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) from mid 1935 through
1942, and the Social Security Administration’s Aid to the Blind, Aid to Dependent Children, and Old-Age
Assistance programs after 1935. The principal goal of these programs was to provide immediate relief to the
unemployed and low-income people, as 85% of the grants were used to hire the unemployed on work relief jobs.
These relief jobs ranged from make-work activities to maintenance activities to the building of sidewalks, post
offices, schools, local roads, and other additions to local infrastructure. The public works grants included
expenditures by the Public Works Administration (PWA), Public Buildings Administration, and the Public Roads
Administration. These grants were also used largely to employ workers. Many of the workers hired came from the
9
New Deal spending did not represent all federal spending, so our analysis does not address the impact of all forms of federal expenditures.
Much of the New Deal represented an entirely new role for the federal government. For example, agricultural spending, relief spending, many
forms of lending to state and local governments, and insurance of mortgage loans broke new ground for the federal government. The New Deal
programs caused federal intergovernmental and direct outlays on education to rise from 26 million in 1932 to 235 million in 1934, on highways
from 217 million to 599 million, on public welfare and employment security from 2 million to 585 million, on housing and urban renewal from 0
in 1932 to 3 million in 1934 to 71 in 1936. Federal outlays on the pre-1930 primary tasks of the federal government generally did not display the
same marked jumps. See Wallis (1985) and US Bureau of the Census (1975, pp. 1124–1126).
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relief rolls, but the public works programs had more freedom to hire a broader class of workers who were not on
relief. The public works programs were said to be more focused on building larger scale projects such as dams,
roads, schools, and sanitation facilities. The work relief programs also built many major public projects, as relief
administrators typically carved large-scale projects into several small projects that allowed them to avoid
administrative limits (Clarke, 1996, pp. 62–68; Schlesinger, 1958, pp. 263–296).
The major relief and public works programs had the potential to stimulate migration across counties, as the
unemployed sought work in areas with new relief and public works projects. The economics literature on the impact
of welfare benefits on locational choice in the modern era is mixed, some find that movement of low income people
is positively correlated to differences in states welfare benefit levels (Blank, 1998; Gramlich and Laren, 1984;
Moffitt, 1992), while others find a small or negligible effect (Allard and Danziger, 2000; Kauffman and Kiesling,
1997, and Levine and Zimmerman, 1999).We should note that our measure of relief and public works spending is
total spending per capita, so it combines both differences in the number of people obtaining funds and the monthly
payments to recipients of emergency jobs or direct relief. There were federal efforts to establish a certain minimum
level of benefits, but the eventual compromise between officials at all levels was to pay attention to prevailing wage
levels. Faced with extraordinary unemployment rates, relief officials were forced to make tradeoffs between
providing adequate benefits and finding work for as many unemployed workers as possible (see Brown, 1940;
Howard, 1943; Williams, 1968; Wallis and Benjamin, 1981). Given the large number of unemployed workers,
access to benefits might have been as important as the actual level of benefits.
Since the public works and relief projects involved not only relief of economic distress, but also led to
expansions in civil infrastructure that potentially promoted economic activity in a deeply depressed national
economy, we might expect to see more of a migration response in the 1930s than we would for federal welfare
programs in the modern era. The migration response during the Depression, however, might have been limited by a
complex web of residency requirements for relief eligibility. Unlike modern federal welfare programs that have
largely eliminated residency requirements since 1970 (Gramlich and Laren, 1984, p. 490), the residency
requirements of the Depression-era relief programs were quite complex and may have mitigated the incentive to
migrate simply because grant expenditures were more generous elsewhere. Donald Howard (1943, pp. 332–337)
noted that the official WPA policy as of 1939 was that eligible people could not be refused certification for work
relief jobs on the basis of non-residence in the area. At the same time, the WPA did not want families moving for the
‘‘sole purpose’’ of obtaining a relief job. Most of the barriers to movement were erected by state and local
bureaucracies, which created elaborate procedures for transferring workers’ records from one state to another and
required that workers reestablish their eligibility in new places, among other factors. An unemployed worker took an
additional risk by moving because state and local length-of-residency requirements for direct relief and public
assistance may have differed. The de facto result might have been limits on non-residents’ abilities to qualify for the
WPA positions. On the other hand, to the extent that work relief projects stimulated the local economy, there may
have been increased private opportunities for migrants.
The FERA policies for most types of relief were similar to the later WPA policies, although the FERA
explicitly provided a small portion of its funds for the transient population. Josephine Brown (1940, p. 250) noted
that federal FERA policy forbade discrimination against non-residents, blacks, aliens, and veterans, ‘‘yet the fact
remained that the actual administration of relief was in the hands of local authorities and the promulgation of a rule
by the FERA was not sufficient in many cases to overcome sectional traditions and prejudices in a comparatively
short time.’’ Aware of this problem, the FERA formulated a transient program for workers with less than a year’s
continuous residence (Williams, 1968, pp. 172–173). The program was funded by the federal government and
administered by the states. It typically provided aid to the transient unemployed who could not have obtained aid
under the legal settlement or residency requirements of the states (Webb, 1936, pp. 1–4, 16). The transient program
accounted for about 2% of the total obligations of FERA programs (Federal Works Agency, Work Projects
Administration, 1942, pp. 74 and 81), so in the final analysis the impact of FERA spending on migration patterns
may not have differed much from that of the WPA. 10
The public works programs under the Public Works Administration, Public Buildings Administration, and
the Public Roads Administration also were influenced by residency requirements because they too hired from the
relief rolls. However, the mandates for these agencies allowed them to focus less on providing immediate
employment and more on building long-term, large-scale projects like dams, roads, schools, sanitation facilities, and
other forms of civil infrastructure. Thus, administrators followed longer lead times in developing projects, had more
leeway in using funds for materials, and worried more about hiring workers with the specific skills needed to
10
The Civilian Conservation Corps often moved young men across states, but we do not have county level information on the CCC and, thus,
cannot measure its impact in this study.
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complete a particular project (Schlesinger, 1958, pp. 263–296; Clarke, 1996, pp. 62–68). As a result, they operated
with fewer restrictions on hiring from the resident labor pool near the project because a number of the projects were
in relatively isolated areas.
The other major category of New Deal grant funding was the AAAs payments to farmers to remove land
from production. The impact of the Agricultural Adjustment Act on net migration combines countervailing effects
for different groups in the farm economy. A simple analysis might suggest that AAA spending, by putting more
money directly into the hands of farmers, stimulated economic activity. At the margin, for farm owners who were on
the verge of shutting down and leaving farming, the AAA payments likely kept them from leaving. On the other
hand, a number of scholars suggest that the consequences of AAA spending might have led to the outmigration of
farm workers and tenants. The AAA spending on rental and benefit payments through 1935 and on conservation
payments after 1936 was designed to reduce acreage under production. The reduction of acreage likely caused a
direct decline in the demand for the labor services of sharecroppers, cash renters, and wage laborers. Lee Alston
(1981) argues that the AAA encouraged landowners to mechanize, which lowered the demand even further. Other
scholars suggest that landowners received the bulk of AAA payments, while tenants and sharecroppers often did not
receive shares commensurate with their productive activity. A number of tenants and croppers, as a result, may have
lost their positions (see Biles, 1994, pp. 39–43; Holley et al., 1971; Mertz, 1978; Saloutos, 1974; Whatley, 1983).
All of these changes suggest that areas with larger per capita AAA payments were likely to experience net outmigration among farm workers. Thus, when measuring the final effect of the AAA payments on net migration in a
cross-section of counties, the result will depend on whether the outflow of farm laborers was more than offset by a
reduction in the exodus of farm owners.
Table 1 shows the variation in public works and relief spending and in AAA spending across states. The
variation across counties within states was often greater than the variation across states. 11 The literature on the
determinants of the distribution of New Deal funds has focused on whether the Roosevelt administration used the
funds to promote relief, reform, and recovery or to promote their own presidential aspirations. An extensive
discussion of these issues for nearly 20 New Deal programs and citations to the substantial literature on the topic at
the state level is available in Fishback et al. (2003b). The impact of nearly all of the variables found in those studies
on New Deal spending can be seen in the first-stage equations in the far right of Table 3 below.
4. An empirical model of migration and the New Deal
Given the disparate impact of the depression across the country and the unequal distribution of New Deal spending,
we would expect that people moved if they were able to enhance their economic positions (Greenwood, 1975,
Greenwood, 1985). The net-migration rate that we are modeling is the difference between in-migration and outmigration at the county level. Studies of migration suggest that economic opportunities, the demographics of the
population, public policies, and county amenities and disamenities generally influence net migration. The following
equation can be used to conceptualize the analysis:

is the average annual net migration during the 1930s in county i (measured as a rate per 1000 people in 1930).
is a measure of average annual income per capita,
is average annual per capita New Deal relief and public
works spending, and Ai is average annual per capita AAA spending in county i. Because migration patterns of the
1930s may have been based on prior trends, which could have influenced New Deal spending, we have included a
proxy for net migration during the 1920s—the growth rate in population from 1920 to 1930
. 12 By
controlling for prior population growth, we have attempted to capture the impact of path dependence and prior
migration trends. Numerous studies show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the propensity to move among
people of various demographic backgrounds. The sum
indicates a series of coefficients and variables that
describe the various demographic features of the population in 1930, including the percentages of the population that
lived in urban areas and that were black, foreign born, and in various age groups. The environmental or geographic
amenities and disamenities associated with living in county i were also likely to influence migration decisions and
11
Table 2 in Fishback et al.s (forthcoming, 2005a) study of the variation in retail sales per capita shows the means, standard deviations, and
minimums and maximums for each county.
12
We have been unable to create a good measure of net migration by county for the 1920s for the entire country. A number of states did not join
the birth and death registration areas until sometime during the 1920s, leading to large numbers of missing values. Nor can we use the Gardner
and Cohen technique because the 1920 census does not report the age/race/sex breakdowns by county necessary to perform their calculations.
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these factors are included in the
term. To help further reduce unmeasured heterogeneity across counties, we
have included a vector of state dummy variables, S, to control for differences in state spending on various New Deal
programs, taxation, cost-of-living, amenities, and other factors that were common to all counties within the same
state, but varied across states. is the error term.
A potential problem that arises in estimating the impact of various variables on net migration is that the
demographic or economic correlates may themselves have been influenced by migration during the 1930s. For
example, the age distribution in an area where there was substantial net in-migration was likely to become more
skewed toward young adult ages because they were more likely to migrate. Thus, coefficients using variables
measured during the 1930s or 1940 will display some simultaneity bias. To reduce this form of bias, at every
opportunity we have used information on the economic or demographic environment in a county in 1929 and 1930.
As a result, for all but the climate and geography variables—which were unaffected by migration decisions—and the
New Deal variables, the analysis examines the relationship between net migration during the 1930s and the
economic and demographic structure of the counties just prior to the period when the net migration began.
Because comprehensive income estimates are not available at the county level, we use retail sales per capita
in 1929 as a proxy for personal income. 13 We chose retail sales because it was available for every county, unlike
measures of manufacturing earnings per worker and several other measures. More importantly, retail sales seem to
be highly correlated with personal income. Correlations of state-level per capita personal income and retail sales for
the years 1929, 1933, 1935, and 1939 are 0.87, 0.89, 0.88, and 0.90, respectively. In addition to retail sales per
capita, we have also included information on the percentage of the population aged 10 and over that was
unemployed or laid off in 1930, the percentage of families owning their own home in 1930, the percentage of farms
operated by owners in 1929, and the percentage of cultivated acreage that with crop failures in 1929. 14 All of these
variables should help to capture the economic differences across US counties at the start of the Great Depression.
We cannot use pre-existing values when we examine the impact of New Deal grants because such federal
spending was unprecedented in 1930. Because migration flows during the 1930s may have affected New Deal
spending decisions, we develop an instrumental variables approach that mitigates the endogeneity bias. Therefore,
after estimating a simple ordinary least squares equation to establish the baseline correlations between net migration
and the demographic, environmental, and New Deal spending variables, we turn to a two stage least squares
approach to work to control for endogeneity of the New Deal spending. Finally, given that migration flows in the
various counties may have been inter-related, we then expand the analysis to consider spatial correlations in the
errors and considerations of geographic spillovers.
5. Empirical results
To establish a baseline for comparison, we begin with a simple OLS analysis. Table 2 reports the OLS estimates for
the New Deal variables under a variety of specifications. Public works and relief spending, under the OLS
specification, were strongly associated with net in-migration and AAA spending was strongly associated with net
out-migration. In the most basic model where net migration is estimated only as a function of the two grant
categories, an additional annual per capita dollar of public works and relief spending was associated with an increase
in the average annual net-migration rate of 0.22 people per thousand. In contrast, an additional dollar of AAA
spending was associated with net out-migration of 0.38 people per thousand. The signs of the relationships are
robust to the inclusion of additional correlates, although the magnitudes are less in
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Since migration is based primarily on expectations about the future, we have also tried recasting the analysis using a measure of average retail
sales per capita for the 1930s as a measure of future economic opportunities in an area. Including average retail sales per capita for the years
1933, 1935, and 1939 in place of the 1929 value leads to a coefficient that is nearly double the coefficient reported in Tables 3 and 5. However,
there is the possibility of endogeneity bias if in-flows of migrants raised per capita retail sales spending because of agglomeration, for example.
When we treat the 1930s retail sales as an endogenous variable and use retail sales in 1929 as an instrument in the 2SLS analysis, the coefficient
lies somewhere between the coefficient for the 1929 retail sales value and the average 1930s retail sale coefficient when we treat them as
exogenous. We have also explored using logged values of retail sales per capita and population and find the same statistically significant signs for
their effects on net migration. The inclusion of each of these alternative measures of retail sales per capita has little effect on the New Deal
coefficients and t statistics.
14
We have explored using alternative income estimates, like average annual earnings per manufacturing employee or average crop output per
person on farms, but we lose over 600 observations using the manufacturing earnings due to missing values and we had difficulty developing a
good way to combine the two into a good single measure of income. We tried an interpolated measure of per capita personal income at the county
level by using predictions from a cross-state regression of per capita personal income on per capita retail sales and percent urban. The predicted
personal income at the county level was so closely correlated with retail sales (0.95) that we felt it was better to explicitly use retail sales as our
measure of economic activity to avoid misleading the reader about the source of the variation in the economic activity variable.
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absolute value as we control for the additional variables. Once the other correlates and state effects are added, the
public works coefficient falls to 0.178, while the AAA coefficient becomes smaller at
. To put these effects
into perspective, a one-standard-deviation increase in public works and relief spending would have increased net
migration by 0.18 standard deviation. A one-standard-deviation increase in AAA spending would have caused net
migration to fall by 0.08 standard deviation.
Because migration flows, or unobserved variables correlated with migration, might have influenced the
distribution of New Deal grants, we might suspect the OLS estimates are biased. A priori, it is difficult to predict the
direction or magnitude of the endogeneity bias. If out-migration was associated with economic distress during the
1930s, local officials may have sought greater New Deal funds from the federal government to alleviate the local
unemployment situation and to stave off a continuing exodus of the workforce. Roosevelt’s ‘‘relief, recovery, and
reform’’ mantra would suggest that federal officials targeted funds to alleviate such economic problems. In fact,
Fleck (2001b,a, 1999c) and Fishback et al. (2003b) find that both relief and public works spending were positively
related to unemployment in 1930. To the extent that out-migration was a symptom of unfavorable economic
conditions, we might expect federal officials to have distributed more funds to areas where people were more likely
to leave than to arrive. Thus, the endogeneity bias might have been negative, causing the OLS coefficient to
understate the positive effect that public works and relief spending had in attracting migrants.
Alternatively, the endogeneity bias could have gone the other way. Increased in-migration placed greater
pressure on public facilities, such as schools and sanitation and water systems, which would have encouraged local
officials to lobby for New Deal projects that would have alleviated these population pressures. In addition, if
migrants into a county misestimated the employment opportunities in their new homes, their arrival might have
contributed to greater unemployment and the need for federal New Deal assistance. However, the tendency for local
relief officials to restrict non-residents’ relief certification was likely to have mitigated this effect.
It is also likely that the AAA variable is endogenous, but the direction of the bias is unclear. Unlike the
relief programs, the objective of the AAA was to limit national production of various commodities as a means to
raise farm-gate prices. The parameters were designed with national prices and production in mind and, therefore,
were not explicitly tied to local problems. The officialsparameter choices, however, might have been indirectly
influenced by local conditions because national AAA parameters depended on the need to raise prices for specific
crops. Since crop mix varied substantially across the country, and since the distress in specific crops may have been
felt more heavily in some areas than in others, local agricultural conditions may have indirectly influenced the
policy parameters that determined the distribution of AAA funds. Thus, to the extent AAA officials were seeking to
raise prices by reducing production, they may have seen reductions in production caused by the out-migration of
farmers as a means in itself to limit supply and, thus, saw less of a need to provide AAA funds. Under these
conditions, the OLS coefficient of the AAA variable is likely biased upward. On the other hand, federal officials
may have seen out-migration as a sign of distress and, thus, more reason to find ways to prop up farmers in those
areas. In this case the OLS coefficient would be biased downward.
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5.1. Instrumental variables
To correct for the endogeneity biases of the New Deal variables, we follow a two stage least squares (2SLS)
approach. Since the success of this empirical strategy depends on the credibility of the instruments that are chosen,
we follow a stringent set of criteria for choosing suitable identifying instruments. First, the instruments must have
been determined prior to the decisions made about New Deal spending and migration to avoid the potential for
simultaneity bias. Second, to insure that the variables have power and make sense in the first-stage regression for
which they are primary instruments, the coefficients must have the predicted signs in the appropriate first-stage New
Deal regression and the effects must be both economically and statistically significant. Third, it must be the case that
a series of tests, described below, cannot reject the hypothesis of no correlation between the identifying instruments
and the estimated 2SLS error term of the second-stage migration equation. In other words, we are testing whether
the instruments themselves have been inappropriately omitted from the migration equation.
There is an extensive literature on the geographic distribution of New Deal spending that suggests that New
Deal officials responded in part to political considerations when making their allocation decisions. 15 Robert Fleck
(1999a), Fishback et al. (2003a), and Fishback et al. (2005a) have had success using some of these political variables
as instruments in studies of unemployment statistics, infant mortality, and retail sales growth, respectively. Of the
group of instruments that have been proposed in the literature, only one variable meets the requirements that we
have laid out above. Gavin Wright (1974) originally suggested that New Deal officials could reap a relatively larger
marginal political benefit by spending an additional dollar in areas where voters were more likely to switch their
party loyalties from one presidential election to another. Wright operationalized this idea using the standard
deviation of the percent voting Democrat in presidential elections from 1896 to 1932, but to avoid simultaneity
problems in our analysis we calculate the standard deviation through the 1928 election. Nearly every study of New
Deal spending has found this swing-voting measure to be an important determinant of the distribution of spending
both at the state and the county level and it has an important positive effect on public works and relief spending in
the first-stage analysis here. 16 The question remains as to whether it is correlated with the error term of the secondstage net-migration equation. There is no possibility that net migration in the 1930s would have influenced
presidential voting prior to 1929. On the other hand, should the variable be included as a regressor in the netmigration equation or could it be correlated with unobservables in this second-stage equation? Our sense is that New
Deal officials focusing on re-election would have been interested in the volatility of Democratic support, but that
this would not carry over to the migration decisions of individual voters, particularly since we are controlling for the
mean percent voting Democrat for president from 1896 to 1928 in the net-migration equation. People might be
interested in moving to areas where there is a substantial community of politically like-minded voters, but after
controlling for the mean, we do not believe that the volatility of that support would be particularly important to
them.
A number of scholars have used natural resource endowments or physical characteristics as instruments in
cross-sectional analyses in part because these factors were established long before the economic decisions under
consideration in the research were made (see, e.g., Frankel and Romer, 1999; Hoxby, 2000). The presence of a
major river in a county, for example, likely influenced public works and relief spending because the potential for
flooding and the requirements for dredging and docks and other public services along the river provided local
officials with ready-made projects that they could propose to federal New Deal administrators. More major rivers
and bigger rivers in a county meant more public works opportunities for dredging and dock facilities. In the case of
agriculture, rivers were likely to influence the types of crops chosen and, hence, the pattern of AAA spending.
To create a useful instrument, we had to look beyond the mere presence of a river because every county in
the United States has at least one river, and often many more, within its boundaries. Therefore, we developed three
variables describing each county’s access to ‘‘major’’ rivers because the size of dredging and port projects was
likely to increase as the rivers increase in size. Our first definition of a major river is one that passes through 50 or
15
For discussions of the determinants of New Deal spending, see Reading (1973), Wright (1974), Wallis (1987, 1998, 2001), Anderson and
Tollison (1991), Couch and Shughart (1998), Couch et al. (1998), Fleck (1999a,b, 2001a,b), Couch and Williams (1999), and Fishback et al.
(2003b). The last paper summarizes the results of all of the studies and provides new estimates.
16
Fleck’s (2001a,2001b,2001c) county-level research finds that swing voters were important determinants of the number of relief jobs allocated
to a county and the standard deviation could be used as an instrument for relief in a 2SLS county unemployment rate analysis. He has also
explored more complicated interactions of swing voting with voter loyalty. In response to suggestions that we explore differential effects for the
standard deviation on the New Deal distribution related to urbanization, region, and Democratic loyalty, we have also tried adding interactions
between a southern region dummy, percent urban, and a Democratic loyalty variable to the list of identifying instruments. Their inclusion as
instruments leads to the same qualitative conclusions about the effects of the New Deal, but sharply reduces the F statistic for the hypothesis test
that the coefficients of the identifying instruments are all zero. Another suggestion was to use state capitals as an instrument, but it had little effect
on the New Deal variables.
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more counties, which includes only the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri Rivers. For this category, the variable
records the number of these three major rivers that passed through the county. The second variable measures the
number of rivers in the county that pass through 21–50 total counties and the third variable measures the number of
rivers in the county that pass through 11–20 total counties. The three groupings captured nearly all of the major
rivers in the US. 17 Could the rivers have influenced net-migration decisions? Certainly, rivers influence the location
of cities, farming decisions, and economic activity, which, in turn, may influence migration. However, many of the
avenues by which the presence of rivers would have influenced net migration—population growth in the prior
decade, economic activity, urbanization, farm structure, state fixed effects, home ownership, etc.—are controlled for
in the second-stage migration equation. Thus, for the river variables to be unsuitable instruments, they would have to
have an additional influence on the migration equation error term above and beyond these other control factors. It
might seem that river travel would have influenced the costs of moving, but the expansion of the rail network and
the automobile was likely to have reduced the role of river travel in migration by 1930. River travel by this time was
more oriented toward freight traffic than passenger traffic.
In their analysis of the determinants of 18 New Deal programs, Fishback et al. (2003b) found that the
elasticity of per capita AAA spending with respect to average farm size in 1929 was larger than nearly every other
elasticity among all the programs. Net migration during the 1930s obviously could not have influenced average farm
size in 1929, but we need to consider whether average farm size belongs to the net-migration equation or whether it
might be correlated with unobservables in the equation. At first blush it would seem that farm scale could have
influenced the course of agricultural development during the 1930s and, thus, could have influenced net migration.
However, the likely mechanism through which farm size would have influenced net migration is through income
opportunities. But income opportunities have largely been controlled in the regression with the inclusion of
unemployment variables in 1930, retail sales per capita, farm ownership, crop failures, and a dummy variable
measuring whether the county experienced the Dust Bowl during the 1930s (see Hansen and Libecap, 2004).
The final instrument we use is the available water capacity (AWC) of the soil within the county. Generally
speaking, AWC is a measure of the amount of water that the soil makes available for plant use. 18 We expect soil
quality to be an effective instrument for AAA spending since public policy decisions were unlikely to affect the
physical nature of soil. Again the question arises whether certain soil types were more affected by the climatic
events of the 1930s, which, in turn, may have influenced migration. What mitigates the direct influence of soil
quality on migration is the inclusion of a set of variables measuring precipitation and drought during the 1930s, their
interactions with the level of agricultural activity in the county, and the Dust Bowl dummy variable.
There is reason to believe that each of the instruments influences at least one New Deal policy, but there
may be concern that there still exists correlation between the identifying instruments and the error term of the
second-stage migration equation, even after controlling for the major determinants of net migration. We believe that
the set of independent variables in the equation forecloses the avenues for such correlation, but since the true error
term is unobservable, there is no way to eliminate this concern fully. To mitigate this concern, however, we tested
the hypothesis that the group of identifying instruments is uncorrelated with the 2SLS estimates of the migration
error term (Hausman, 1983, p. 433; see also Greene, 2003, pp. 413–414). We performed these tests with a variety of
combinations of instruments and in no case did the test suggest that the identifying instruments as a group had been
inappropriately omitted from the migration equation, despite our using a low threshold for rejection. As a final check
on the robustness of the results, we have estimated the model using various combinations of the instruments so that
the reader can readily see how the coefficients on public works and relief spending and on AAA spending are
affected by changes in the set of instruments used.
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In 1763 counties the value for each major river variable was zero. The maximum number of major rivers within a county was two for the rivers
passing through 11–20 total counties, three for the rivers passing through 21–50 total counties, and two for the largest rivers. Summing the total
major rivers across all three categories, the maximum in any one county was four. We control for the possibility that bigger counties would have
had more rivers by including county land area in the analysis.
18
According to the US Natural Resources Conservation Service, AWC is ‘‘the volume of water released from the soil between the time the soil is
at field capacity (the maximum water held in soil against the pull of gravity) until the time it is at the wilting point (the amount of water held too
tightly in soil for commonly grown crops to extract). Loamy soils and soils high in organic matter have the highest AWC.’’ See
http://soils.usda.gov/sqi/soil_quality/what_is/glossary.html. We have also experimented with using other dimensions of soil quality, including
clay content, k-factor measures of soil loss due to water, the liquid limit of the soil, organic matter, permeability of the soil, soil depth, a measure
of hydrologic characteristics, drainage, slope, hydric nature of the soils, and annual flood frequency. None display as strong an effect on AAA
spending or public works spending as the AWC in the first stage. When we include these other characteristics as exogenous variables in both the
first and second stages, we continue to find strong positive effects of public works and relief on net migration and strong negative effects of the
AAA.
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5.2. 2SLS New Deal results
Table 3 reports the 2SLS estimates from the net-migration equation, along with the first-stage results of the
relief/public works and AAA equations using the six instruments described above. The coefficients of the
instruments in the first-stage regressions are generally consistent with our expectations. Greater volatility of
Democratic voting at the county level and the presence of rivers had strong positive effects on public works and
relief spending, while better quality soil as measured by AWC caused such spending to be lower. 19 Larger average
farm size, better soil quality, and access to the Ohio, Mississippi, or Missouri Rivers had a positive and statistically
significant impact on AAA spending. F tests show that we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the
identifying instruments were simultaneously zero at the 1% level in each equation. Finally, we performed Hahn and
Hausman (2002) tests for weak instruments and found no sign that the instruments were weak.
The second-stage 2SLS coefficients of the New Deal variables are similar in sign to the OLS results, but
the magnitudes of the 2SLS effects are larger in absolute value.
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The negative sign makes sense if water and soil quality can be seen as substitutes in production, such that better water soil quality requires less
in the way of irrigation projects.
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As expected, relatively more spending on public works and on relief to the unemployed was associated with net inmigration. The public works and relief 2SLS coefficient is nearly triple the size of the OLS estimate. An additional
dollar of public works and relief spending increased net in-migration by 0.52 people per thousand. The effect of a
one-standard-deviation increase in public works and/or relief spending of $20 would have led to a 0.54 standard
deviation increase in net migration. Note that a relative increase in net migration could have occurred either because
more people entered the county or relatively fewer people left. Given that state and local officials who certified
workers for emergency work seem to have established de facto residency requirements, it may be that greater public
works and relief spending did more to encourage workers to stay in their home counties than to attract people from
other counties that may have received relatively less New Deal funding.
Both the OLS and 2SLS coefficients show that relatively more AAA spending was associated with outmigration with coefficients that are statistically significant at the 10% level. The results suggest that AAA spending
likely contributed to an excess pool of farm workers, sharecroppers, and tenants who migrated out of agricultural
areas as the AAA encouraged a reduction in the amount of land under production. This outflow of farm workers
more than offset any effects that AAA benefit payments had on reducing out-migration by farm owners and tenants
who were recipients of the payments. The AAA effect on net out-migration was larger in absolute value under the
2SLS model, such that a one-dollar increase in annual per capita AAA spending was associated with net outmigration of 0.18 people per thousand. A one-standard-deviation increase in AAA spending of $14 would have
caused a reduction in the net migration rate of 0.13 standard deviation. The magnified 2SLS effect indicates that the
15

endogeneity bias in the OLS coefficient was likely positive, suggesting that AAA officials might have treated outmigration from a region as a signal that they did not have to spend as much on benefit payments to reduce
agricultural production since the exodus of people from the county was already contributing to lower output.
Table 4 reports the sensitivity of the results to instrument selection by providing a detailed comparison of
the results under different instrument combinations. The public works and relief 2SLS coefficients are consistently
positive and larger than the OLS coefficient under all instrument combinations. The 2SLS AAA coefficients are
larger, in absolute value, than the OLS coefficient. The public works and relief coefficients are larger and more
precisely estimated when the volatility of Democratic voting is included, while the inclusion of the river variables
tends to dampen the coefficient. The AAA coefficient is more precisely estimated when the average farm size
variable is included, and its inclusion tends to diminish the negative effect AAA spending had on net migration.
6. Controlling for geographic spillovers
When empirically estimating the determinants of inter-county migration, one potential consideration is the spatial
proximity between the geographic areas from

where migrants came and to where they went. When people were considering a move, they likely compared the
level of economic activity and New Deal spending in their home county with the situation in other places across the
United States. Further, there may be unobservable factors influencing net migration that potentially are correlated
with the unobservable factors in other counties. Since the vast majority of migrations are over shorter distances, it is
likely that net migration will be more influenced by economic activity in nearby counties and that the correlations in
unobservables will be stronger for unobservables in nearby counties. We control for these ‘‘spatial lags’’ in the
errors using distance-based weights, and account for the endogeneity of our estimation, using methods developed by
Kelejian and Prucha (2004).
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To examine this relationship we have explored taking into consideration spatial correlations in the error
term and also the impact of economic activity (exogenous retail sales per capita, Y) in nearby counties. The new
equation to be estimated becomes:

where
is a distance-based weighted average of the exogenous retail sales in the counties j that neighbor county
i and is the error. 20 Spatial spillovers in the errors can be modeled as:
where
is a zero-mean disturbance with variance , and is a scalar spatial autoregressive parameter. Eq. (4)
implies that the error
is a function of errors in neighboring counties
For computational parsimony, we
assume that the spatial relationships, g, are equivalent in Eqs. (3) and (4). We assume that is a weighted-average
function and, as a result,

The requirement that
ensures that the county of interest i is not spatially correlated with itself and the
requirement that the
sum to one is a normalization so that relative (and not absolute) relationships between
counties matter. We select the weighting parameters
based on geographic distance between counties, a
commonly accepted parameterization in the spatial analysis literature. For example, Attfield et al. (2000) use
geographic distance parameterizations to test the growth rate convergence hypothesis across US states.
Thus,

where
is the distance between the seats of counties i and j, and
is a maximal distance or ‘‘cutoff’’ beyond
which spatial effects are zero. We experimented with cutoff distances of 100, 200, and 600 miles, meaning that
counties with county seats beyond that distance received a weight of zero. We have two reasons for imposing the
cutoff distances. First, short moves across county boundaries were the most likely, as potential migrants were able to
acquire more accurate information about opportunities in close neighboring counties and were likely to find it less
personally daunting to move nearby (Schwartz, 1973). We know from the 1940 Census that
of those who
said they moved between 1935 and 1940 moved within the same state. Second, consistent estimation requires that
the spatial weighting matrix be sparse (Kelejian and Prucha, 1999; Assumption 3). Imposing a cutoff of up to 200
miles or less is theoretically appealing because it provides the sparseness necessary for consistent estimation of the
spatial parameter, Moreover, Assumption 2 of Kelejian and Prucha (1999) requires that
, and the 200-mile
cutoff ensures that our estimate of satisfies this condition. 21
Stacking observations in the main Eq. (3) and the error process Eq. (4) yields:

20

We have also explored the possibility of including spillover effects for the endogenous New Deal spending variables. Our initial results
suggested that the weighted values of the New Deal variables in neighboring counties out to 100 miles were small and statistically insignificant.
There was also a substantial reduction in the public works and relief coefficient for spending in county i, but little change in the AAA coefficient.
One problem that arises when we seek to include the neighboring New Deal variables is that we are including neighbor-weighted endogenous
variables. This requires an expansion in the number of instruments. The Kelejian–Prucha solution to this problem is to add neighbor-weighted
averages for all of the exogenous variables in G2SLS system, which leads to a very large number of identifying instruments. Closer inspection
shows that the change in results for the relief/public works coefficient is driven not by the inclusion of the neighbor-weighted New Deal
variables, but instead by the addition of the large number of new identifying instruments. When we estimate the model with the expanded list of
neighbor-weighted instruments without including the neighbors New Deal spending in the final model, we see the same change in the public
works and relief coefficient. It turns out that it is the addition of these additional instruments and not the inclusion of the New Deal spending in
nearby counties that is causing the sharp change in the public works spending coefficient. In essence, the Kelejian– Prucha method leads us into a
situation identified by Bound et al. (1995) where the inclusion of a large number of instruments, many of which are unrelated to the endogenous
variable, creates a substantial problem with weak instrument bias, a finding corroborated in our data using a Hahn–Hausman (2002) test.
21
An empirical artifact of these data is that as
increases, the magnitude of our estimate of q increases.
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where W is an
spatial weighting matrix, consisting of typical element . Under suitable conditions, outlined
in Kelejian and Prucha (1999) and satisfied here, the system is amenable to a generalized two stage least squares
(G2SLS) procedure, which produces consistent estimates of the parameters. A discussion of the estimation
procedure is outlined in Appendix B.
6.1. Generalized two stage least squares results
Table 5 offers a comparison of results from the generalized two stage least squares estimation in which we account
for spatial correlation in the errors and then include a spatial weighting of economic activity in nearby counties.
Under all specifications in Table 5, the magnitudes and statistical inferences related to the New Deal grants are
similar to what we found under the 2SLS model. Public works and relief were associated with in-migration, while
AAA spending was associated with outmigration.

When we include neighborsretail sales directly in the equation, we see very little change in the coefficient
on per capita retail sales in the county of interest. Thus, the impact of an additional dollar of per capita retail sales
leads to a 0.01 increase in the net-migration rate, whether we control for the neighbors’ retail sales or not. Directly
controlling for economic activity in neighboring counties reinforces the importance that economic opportunity plays
in the migration decision. Holding retail sales in county i constant, a dollar increase in average retail sales in nearby
counties would have been associated with a
change in the net-migration rate. The coefficient is statistically
significant at the 10% level only in the specification that includes neighboring counties out to 200 miles, however.
Thus, relatively more people would have moved to county i if either economic activity increased in that county or if
other neighboring counties experienced decreased activity.
7. Significance of the New Deal in explaining net migration
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Migration is a complex phenomenon with a variety of determinants, so to put the importance of the New Deal into
proper perspective, we estimate how much of the differences in net migration across counties can be explained by
the differences in New Deal spending across these same counties. We split the sample into the 931 counties that
experienced net in-migration and the 2117 counties that experienced net out-migration. We then determined the
means for the in-migration and out-migration samples. The mean net-migration rate for the counties experiencing
net in-migration was 13, while the mean for the net out-migrant counties was
per thousand. We then
performed a decomposition of the difference in the means between the two groups. The decomposition shows the
percentage of the difference in net-migration rates between the two groups of counties that can be explained by the
average differences in the means of each independent variable. It combines the marginal effects measured by the
coefficients with the relative size of the variablesdifferences across the two groupings of counties. The
decompositions were performed for the estimates using OLS and 2SLS from Table 3 and the G2SLS with spatial
corrections out to 100 miles in Table 5.
The decompositions show that the New Deal programs have economically significant power in explaining
the net-migration patterns across counties. The mean annual public works and relief spending was $23.5 in net inmigration counties compared with $15.5 in net out-migration counties. This $8 difference accounts for 5.51–16.3%
of the difference in average net-migration rates between the two types of counties, depending on the specification.
Another way to describe the effect is to consider the effect of a one-standard-deviation change in public works and
relief spending. A one-standard-deviation change of $20 per capita contributed to a 0.18–0.50 standard deviation
increase in the net-migration rate. This effect is among the largest that we find for any variable in the system.
Meanwhile, the AAA grants had smaller but still economically important effects, possibly because of the
countervailing migration incentives created for farm owners and farm workers. The counties with net in-migration
received an annual average of AAA grants of about $4 per person compared with an annual average of $11 per
person in areas with net out-migration. This difference in average AAA spending explains between 2.9 and 4.9% of
the difference in net-migration rates between the two types of counties. A one-standard-deviation increase in AAA
spending per capita of $14 contributed to a
standard deviation reduction in the net-migration
measure.
8. Other determinants of inter-county migration
The New Deal was only one of a large number of factors that influenced migration during the 1930s. Our analysis
reinforces a finding in other studies that economic opportunity is important to the migration decision. Our analysis
also adds new insights into the effects of geography and climate on the choice to migrate. Table 6 summarizes the
results from various specifications.
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As in many migration studies, measures of economic opportunity have the anticipated effects. There was
more net in-migration (less out-migration) in counties with higher retail sales per capita in 1929 (our proxy for
income). The difference in average retail sales between the group of counties experiencing positive net migration
and the group of counties with negative net migration explains between 5.2 and 6.9% of the average differences in
net migration between the two groups. When we add the impact of neighboring counties, holding constant the value
in the county of interest, a reduction in retail sales in nearby counties explains about 4.9% of the difference in net
migration between the two groups. Areas with higher homeownership rates and with lower shares of the population
unemployed and laid off in 1930 experienced more net in-migration, although the unemployment and layoff effects
are statistically insignificant. 22 Farm areas where there were a higher proportion of owner-operated farms and areas
with more farm failures in 1929 experienced out-migration.
Bogue et al. (1957) have suggested that blacks were moving out of the South during the 1930s. There are
signs that southern counties with relatively higher black population shares experienced net out-migration, while
areas outside the South with relatively larger black population shares experienced in-migration. At the margin, areas
with a higher percentage foreign-born population experienced net in-migration. The 1930s appears to have slowed
or even slightly reversed the long-term US pattern of net in-migration into urban areas. Counties that had relatively
greater urban populations and that had larger populations were more likely to experience net out-migration, although
the coefficients are not statistically significant. Counties with a higher share of the population belonging to formal
religious denominations tended to experience out-migration.
The results of the age distribution variables suggest that young adults may have been moving to exploit
mismatches between the labor force requirements and the available working population in particular counties. Areas
with a larger percentage of the population aged 10–19 in 1930, the group entering the workforce for the first-time,
experienced more out-migration, while areas with a larger percentage of the population aged 55–64, the age group
most likely to be exiting the workforce, experienced in-migration. 23 In the decompositions between in-migration and
out-migration counties, these age effects, respectively, contribute to explaining up to 17.3 and 9.1% of the
differences in net-migration rates.
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In the analysis the coefficients of unemployment measures in 1930 both are negative but are statistically insignificant. There are two additional
measures at the county level that might be used as a sign of unemployment during the 1930s—the FERA survey of the number of people on relief
as of October 1933 and the Census Bureaus voluntary postal census of the totally and partially unemployed in November 1937. When the Census
checked the postal census with an enumeration census, they found that nearly all workers on emergency projects (the WPA) had filled out cards,
but that 35% of the totally unemployed were left uncounted and 42% of the partially unemployed were left uncounted. We have experimented
with including the number on relief in 1933 and found that the number on relief was associated with outmigration but the coefficient was
statistically insignificant. Of course, this measure serves also as a measure of availability of relief, so the small effect would not be surprising.
When we include the percentages of totally and partially unemployed (leaving out emergency workers) in 1937, we get a statistically significant
and strong relationship between both measures and out-migration. This effect might be overstated to the extent that out-migration reduced
unemployment problems. The inclusion of these alternative estimates of unemployment variables has little effect on the New Deal coefficients
and t statistics.
23
By 1940 the percentage of men aged 65 and over in the labor force had fallen to 50%, and a significant proportion of those considered
themselves retired. See Costa (1998, chapter 1).
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Migration studies suggest that prior movers are more likely to move again than stayers and that migration
to areas tends to display persistence and path dependence across decades. Although we were unable to get county
measures of net migration in the 1920s, we used population growth from 1920 to 1930 as a proxy for prior
migration. The population growth coefficient showed strong persistence of migration trends from the 1920s.
The inclusion of a wide variety of climactic and geographic variables offers an opportunity to examine
what people in the 1930s considered amenities and disamenities. The Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coastal counties
tended to attract more inmigrants than out-migrants, while counties with access to the Pacific Coast were associated
with net out-migration, all else equal. Areas with more lakes attracted net in-migration, while counties with larger
land areas were associated with out-migration. People appear to have been dissatisfied with regions with more
variation in elevation, as a greater range in the elevation within the county was associated with out-migration. While
controlling for elevation range, counties with higher maximum elevations were associated with in-migration. There
also appears to have been a strong southern trend in migration. The coefficient on latitude suggests a movement to
more southern areas. The latitude effect is present when state effects are excluded. There is no effect of longitude
until state effects are removed from the model, which leads to signs of westward movement.
The 1930s seems to have been a period of climatic disasters, of which the Dust Bowl was only one. Given
the greater importance of climate to farming, we included interactions between climate and the percentage of a
countys land in agricultural use. In areas where farms were less important, greater average precipitation and
increases in the number of months of extreme and severe wetness were associated with out-migration. In contrast,
the more acreage of land in farms, the more likely was in-migration to be associated with greater average and
extremes in precipitation. After controlling for latitude, higher temperatures had little effect on net migration in nonfarm areas and was associated with out-migration in farm areas. The temperature variable is sensitive to
specification. When latitude is excluded from the analysis, warmer temperatures are associated with in-migration.
Probably the most infamous climate-related event of the 1930s was the Dust Bowl disaster so vividly
portrayed in Steinbecks The Grapes of Wrath. Zeynep Hansen and Gary Libecap (2004) argue that the Dust Bowl
was the result of a combination of inappropriate farming techniques, extreme or severe drought, and high winds.
When we include their measure of Dust Bowl counties, the Dust Bowl counties were associated with an outmigration rate that was from 7.5 to 15.6 greater than in other counties. Given that the Dust Bowl counties were
limited to relatively few counties, the Dust Bowls effect in the decomposition is not as large, explaining from half a
percent to 1.1% of the difference in the average net migration between in-migration and out-migration counties. In
general, months of severe or extreme drought are not statistically significantly associated with net out-migration.
This finding is suggestive that drought alone was not enough to cause net migration. It had to be associated with
inappropriate farm techniques or with high winds as well.
9. Conclusions
The Great Depression was an extraordinary event in the economic history of the United States. There were many
factors influencing net migration and our study of county-level migration trends allowed us to examine many
previously unexamined features of net migration. As millions lost their jobs and inevitably became less
economically tied to their communities, a significant number of people responded to the geographic differences in
economic opportunity by moving. The patterns of net migration show that they typically moved out of areas with
relatively lower per capita retail sales. Counties where home ownership opportunities were greatest in 1930 were
associated with net in-migration. The different age structures across counties may have led to age-related geographic
mismatches between the relative demand and supply of workers at different ages. Thus, areas with larger shares of
young adults entering the workforce for the first time experienced out-migration, while areas with larger shares of
adults on the cusp of retirement experienced more in-migration. Some of the movements during the 1930s were
continuations of population growth trends from the 1920s. However, it appears that the long-term pattern of net
migration into urban areas was halted during the 1930s.
The exodus from the Dust Bowl made famous by Steinbecks story of the Joad family appears to have been
the result of an unusual mixture of drought, wind, and improper farming techniques, as emphasized by the work of
Hansen and Libecap. Measures of drought in other areas did not have much of an impact on net migration, while
areas with excessive or severe episodes of wetness in farm areas drew in-migrants. The population appeared to be
drifting southward and there were moves toward coastal counties in the southeast.
In response to the horrendous economy, the Roosevelt administration developed a variety of New Deal
programs that caused the federal government to distribute grants to all communities in the United States, although
the size of the grants and the mix of purposes varied substantially from county to county. Estimating the impact of
these grants is complicated by potential endogeneity to the extent that the New Deal administrators were using net
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migration as one of many metrics in their decisions on how to distribute the grant funds. Our OLS estimates of the
relationships establish a baseline for the fundamental relationship between net-migration rates and New Deal
spending. We attempt to correct for endogeneity bias using a 2SLS approach. Since we cannot know the true
unmeasured error term in the second-stage migration equation, we cannot know for sure if the identifying
instruments are correlated with that error. The identifying instruments are reasonable if the control variables in the
second-stage equation already capture the avenues by which the identifying instruments might be correlated with net
migration. The econometric tests available suggest that the identifying instruments have not been inappropriately
omitted from the migration equation itself. Ultimately, the 2SLS estimates have the same signs as the OLS estimates
and imply that the OLS estimates provide a lower bound estimate of the absolute value of size of the effects.
However, the size of the 2SLS effects for each type of spending are sensitive to the choice of instruments and so we
can only offer a range of estimates.
The type of grant distributed to the counties mattered greatly. Greater spending on public works and relief
clearly had a strong positive effect on attracting migrants. The provision of emergency public employment allowed
many of the unemployed to find temporary haven and, thus, avoid having to leave their homes. In addition, the
building of civil infrastructure potentially stimulated economic opportunities that reduced out-migration and may
have even encouraged people to move into areas that had relatively higher New Deal public works spending.
Not all New Deal programs drew people in. The AAA programs designed to reduce acreage were
associated with net out-migration, contributing to the declines in the farm population that had begun in the early
1900s. These effects were generally statistically significant at the 10% level. The AAA payments to landowners may
have induced a number of farmers who had previously planned to abandon farming to stay the course. However, this
effect apparently was more than offset by a trend toward greater out-migration by tenants, sharecroppers, and farm
workers. The AAA payments were targeted more towards farm-owners and large-scale farmers, while the reduction
in the acreage they were planting likely led to a reduction in farm labor demand. The AAA association with outmigration suggests that the AAA program may have pushed labor out of agricultural areas.
Robert Moffitt’s (1992) survey of location responses to modern welfare benefits suggests that studies using
individual-level data have been more likely to find migration effects among the poor than studies using more
aggregate data. Therefore, we might find stronger marginal effects for the unemployed population if we were able to
study individual-level data. On the other hand, it is important to look at the county aggregates because the New Deal
was not a set of programs designed simply to alleviate poverty or unemployment. The New Deal provided
employment for a variety of workers. When the national unemployment rate reached 25% by 1933, the ranks of the
unemployed included many who had never anticipated such dire straits. Yet, the public works and relief programs
employed large numbers of skilled workers and opened up whole new regions for economic development. People
moved in order to capture a piece of this economic growth.
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Appendix A. Data appendix
The new estimates of net migration during the 1930s use the Census components of change method described in Eq.
(1). The US Bureau of the Census (1934a,b,c, 1936a,b, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942) reported data on births,
deaths, infant deaths, and stillbirths in each county during the 1930s. The change in population between 1930 and
1940 comes from ICPSR (1992) tape 0003, as corrected by Michael Haines.
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It is well known that there was substantial undercounting of births prior to the 1940s and that the extent of
the undercounting varied geographically (US Bureau of the Census, 1945; US Federal Security Agency, 1946;
Whelpton, 1934). To account for the birth undercount in our migration measure, we adjusted it to mitigate the bias
created in the undercount of birth registrations. Whelpton (1934) and the US Bureau of the Census (1945) compared
birth registration records for the year prior to the census year to the number of children less than 1 year of age as
reported in the 1930 and 1940 censuses, respectively, and estimated the extent of the birth undercounts for each
state. For each state, then, we developed an adjustment factor that enabled us to scale up the births in each of the
states counties. We began with the Census’s 1940 undercount figure for all births in the state (p. 106). We then
interpolated values for each year back to 1930 using the difference between the undercount percentage for whites in
1940 and Whelptons (p. 128) percentage for whites in 1930. Since Texas and South Dakota were not included in
Whelpton’s analysis, we assumed that the 1930 figure was 10% points lower than the 1940 figure.
New Deal spending information is from the US Office of Government Reports (1940a,b). For the case of
the AAA farm payments, we had information for 1933– 1937. Assuming these funds were representative of the
whole periods spending, we scaled the 4 years of information to 6 years by multiplying by 1.5. The retail sales
information is from Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790–1970, ICPSR
study number 0003, as corrected by Michael Haines, and US Department of Commerce (1936, 1939). New Deal
spending per capita was created by dividing by the 1930 population. We calculated 1929 population as 1930 minus
the average change in population between 1930 and 1940; we did not use trends from 1920 to 1930 due to changes
in county boundaries during the 1920s. All monetary variables in our analyses were translated into 1967 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). For the New Deal funds, we used the average annual CPI over the period
1933–1939 (0.412) and 1933–1935 (0.4) (US Bureau of the Census, 1975, p. 211–212, series E-135).
Population in 1930, population growth during the 1920s, unemployment and layoffs in 1930, percent black,
percent urban, percent of land on farms, percent foreign born, percent illiterate, percent homeowners, county land
area, average farm size, percent farms owner-operated, and percent of cultivated acreage that failed are all from the
1920 and 1930 files in ICPSR study number 0003, as corrected by Michael Haines. The percentages of the
population in each age group are from the Gardner and Cohen (1992) ICPSR study number 0020. ‘‘Dust Bowl’’
counties were obtained from Hansen and Libecap (2004). Church membership data come from the US Bureau of
Census (1930), Census of Religious Bodies, 1926. The presidential voting variables—the mean and standard
deviation of the Democratic share of the presidential vote from 1896 to 1928—were calculated using information
from the ICPSR’s (1999), United States Historical Election Returns, 1824–1968 (study number 0001). In some
cases there were missing values for the percent voting for president, so we used averages from the contiguous
counties in their place. The latitude and longitude of county seats are from Sechrist (1984), ‘‘Basic Geographic and
Historic Data’’ (ICPSR study number 8159). We made several corrections to the Sechrist data set, which are
reported in Fishback et al. (2005b, Appendix 1).
The climate data are available from the National Climatic Data Center (NCDR). Text files of the data were
accessed from ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/cirs/ (August 2003). The NCDR reports historical monthly data by
climate division within each state, so each county’s climate information pertains to its respective climate division. In
some cases a county was located within two or three divisions. In these cases, the countys climate information was
calculated as the average across the climate divisions in which it was located.
Using maps we developed dummy variables for coastal access to the Atlantic coast, the Pacific coast, the
Gulf coast, and to the Great Lakes. A county was considered on a coast if it touched the major body of water or was
on a bay, sound, or major river that might be considered to have direct access. Thus, the Washington counties on
Puget Sound are considered Pacific coastal counties by this definition. Counties on the Chesapeake and Potomac,
the southern parts of the Hudson River, and the counties up to Philadelphia are considered Atlantic coast counties.
The US Geological Survey provided a list of all ‘‘streams’’ contained in the USGS’s Geographic Names
Information System (GNIS), along with a list of counties in which each stream is currently located. The GNIS
database contains over 100,000 stream names because a stream is broadly defined to include creeks and rivers. Each
stream is numerically coded, so we performed frequencies to determine the number of counties through which each
stream flows. Since our goal is to measure a countys access to rivers that might have had significant flooding or
required significant public works, we developed a series of variables describing whether a county contained major
rivers, defined as rivers that flowed through a specified number of counties. For example, the first variable measures
the number of rivers in the county that ran through more than 50 counties. Only the Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio
Rivers met this definition. We created additional variables for major rivers that passed through 21–50 counties and
major rivers that passed through 11–20. Furthermore, we developed a series of variables to describe the elevation
range and maximum elevation and information on the number of bays, lakes, beaches, etc., as reported in the USGSs
Geographic Names Information System.The information was downloaded from http://geonames.usgs.gov/stategaz/index.html
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(August 2003). The data set describes features noted on small-scale topographical maps, including mouths of
streams, lakes, valleys, summits, cliffs, bayous, beaches, etc. See Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005b, Appendix
1) for a more complete discussion of the creation of the geography variables and of our handling of county boundary
changes since the New Deal.
The average water content measure from the 1990s came from the State Soil Geographic (STATSGO) Data
Base for the Conterminous United at http://water.usgs.-gov/lookup/getspatial?ussoils. We had the information
converted to county data by using ARC-GIS mapping software to layer county boundaries over the basic data set of
78,518 polygonal land areas and create averages weighted by land area.
The South in this context is defined as the states with ICPSR codes from 40 to 56, including Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, Maryland,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
The data set consists of 3048 counties and county/city combinations in the United States. We had to
combine counties because the New Deal information and some of the birth and death data information used to
calculate net migration overlapped multiple counties. For a list, see Fishback et al. (2005b).
Appendix B. G2SLS estimation procedure
1. Let matrix Z represent all the exogenous variables in the system, including the identifying instruments discussed
in Section 6. Using Z as instruments, perform 2SLS on the migration equation, ignoring the spatial effects in the
error process.
2. Defining the usual 2SLS residuals, e, calculate
ande
. Then, calculate

and
Define

. A consistent estimate of

is calculated by solving the non-linear system:

.
3. Pre-multiply the migration equation by
. G2SLS proceeds by performing ordinary 2SLS on the
transformed equation. See Schmidt (1976)[chapter 4] for details on ordinary 2SLS.
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